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Religion and Minors
The courts of England have more than
once disclaimed any ability or inclination
to decide between the respective merits of
one religion and another-which affords
the greater benefit or the more profound
spiritual guidance to its adherents. The
question however has arisen in several
cases of the particular religious faith in
which a young child, the subject of proceedings before the court, ought to be
nurtured. It is a question on which the
law in England as well as in this country may be said to have grown less definite
over the years.
The October 15, 1962 issue of The Solicitors' Journal examines into the English
law on this perplexing subject and offers
an interesting analysis of the pertinent
cases. According to the note, at common
law the father had very strong rights in
the matter, as is affirmed in Andrews v. Salt
(1873), 8 Ch. App. 622. That case also
shows that the father's rights could be
abandoned by him. But on the common
law has been grafted, as is well known,
the two-fold principle now embodied in
s.1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act,
1925, namely, (1) that, in any proceeding
before any court concerning the custody
or upbringing of an infant, the welfare of
the child shall be the first and paramount
consideration, and (2) that the court shall

not take into consideration whether from
any other point of view the claim of the
father is superior to that of the mother,
or vice versa.
This principle gives only the most general kind of guidance to the court, as is
entirely consistent with modern thinking
on such family questions. The emphasis
has happily moved away from parental
"rights," which tended to deny the child
dignity and a status of his own. Nevertheless, the 1925 section is not without its limitations. It was pointed out by Eve, J., in
Re Thain (1926), Ch. 676, at p. 684, that
Parliament has not said that the welfare
of the child is to be the only consideration;
in fact, the word "paramount" suggests
that there are others which have to be
taken into account, and among these "the
wishes of an unimpeachable parent undoubtedly stand first." This dictum has recently been endorsed by Lord Evershed,
M.R., in Re 0 (Infants) (1962) 1 W.L.R.
724.
Further, the second part of the statutory
principle is directed only to the regulation
inter se of the rights of parents, and the
Court of Appeal in Re Carroll (1931)
1 K.B. 317, held that it could therefore
have no application to the case of an illegitimate child. The somewhat remarkable
Carroll litigation resulted, because of this
finding, in a decision that the mother of an

9
illegitimate child had a legal right to require that it should be educated in the religion of her choice, and that despite the
fact that over a year before the ultimate
decision, she had consented to the child's
adoption by Protestant adopters in whose
custody it had ever since been.
In the case of a legitimate child, howver, the 1925 Act does not cease to apply
merely because of the death of one or both
of the parents. This was held in Re Collins (an Infant) (1950) Ch. 498, where
both parents were dead, and the rival
creeds were advocated respectively by the
infant's paternal and maternal grandparents. The rejection of the argument that in
these circumstances the father's wishes
again became paramount, as at common
law, left the Court of Appeal free to approve the decision of the learned judge not
to disturb the child by removing it from
the Congregationalist family where it had
been for two and a half years. The father
had been a member of the Roman Catholic
church.
Moreover, the boy whose future was in
issue in the Collins case had been baptised
into the Roman Catholic church. No doubt
baptism is one of the factors which
have to be taken into account, but Re Collins is not the only case in which, as regards a young child, it has not been sufficient to outweigh other considerations.
That was the situation, too, in Re Violet
Nevin (an Infant) (1891) 2 Ch. 299, in
which the judgments of Chitty, J., and the
Court of Appeal display an enlightenment
on the whole subject of infant welfare more
akin, if we may say so, to the thought of
this century than the last. They were concerned with an orphan infant with no legal
guardian but with a kindly relative who
had looked after the child, at the father's
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dying wish, for several years. The father
had been a Protestant but, before marrying
his wife (a Roman Catholic), had signed
a document undertaking to have any children of the marriage brought up in the
Roman Catholic faith. This undertaking
had been implemented to the extent that
the child had 'been baptised accordingly,
but it was not legally binding on the father,
and the court declined to infer that in the
events that had happened he would have
wished his young daughter to be taken
away from her relative on religious grounds
-for the relative was a sincere Protestant,
not willing to undertake the legal guardianship if it were subject to a direction to
bring up the child in the Roman faith. The
court gave no such direction, holding that
in the circumstances the only question before it was the child's welfare, having due
regard to the wishes of the father. Possibly
the only modification which a present-day
court would import into this criterion
would be the taking into account of the
mother's wishes as well as the father's; and
since 1925 the paramount consideration of
the child's well-being obtains whether or
not the infant is an orphan.
Re G (an Infant) (1962) 2 W.L.R.
1010; p. 282, ante, related to an illegitimate child under the age of one year, and
there was no evidence that it had been
baptised at all. Nor was there any positive
evidence of the religious faith of the
mother, or any mention in the report that
she had expressed any views on the matter. The problem of religion arose because
the applicants for a provisional adoption
order in respect of the child were of the
Jewish faith.
A provisional adoption order is one
newly authorised by the Adoption Act,
1958, whereby the High Court or a county
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court may authorize the custody of an infant to be given to prospective adopters
who are domiciled outside Great Britain
and who would not therefore qualify as applicants for a full adoption order. It is contemplated that the applicants, if successful,
will take the child to the country of their
domicile and there seek to complete the
adoption. The ordinary conditions precedent to the making of an adoption order
have to be satisfied in such a case in addition to some others, e.g., there must be expert proof of the law of the country in
which the adoption proper is to take place.
All was in order with the application,
and the county court judge therefore had a
discretion to make or to refuse the provisional order. He refused it, giving as his
only ground for so doing the fact that England was a Protestant Christian country
and that he did not feel it right, nor did he
propose, to grant an application for a Protestant child to be adopted by parents of the
Jewish faith.
The English Court of Appeal was satisfied that this was not a proper exercise of
the judge's discretion. To take into account
only this one matter was to give it an exaggerated importance. Willmer, L.J., did
point out, it must be added, that in a great
many cases the matter of religious faith
may be a most important consideration,
and can be vital where the infant is sufficiently old to appreciate and have some
understanding of any change that would
be involved.
The Thalidomide Case
The recent disquieting verdict at Liege,
Belgium in the thalidomide case has
prompted an interesting comment in the
November 17, 1962 issue of The London
Tablet.

According to the Tablet, Belgium has a
very large Catholic population, but also a
very large Liberal and Socialist one, with
the Catholic strength among the Flemish,
and the Liberal and Socialist strength
among the French-speaking Walloons. The
law has to be a law for both, and does not
profess to be the projection of Catholic
moral theology, or to impose on nonCatholics a Catholic teaching which sees
earthly life essentially in terms of preparation for a real life that is only to begin
when this brief, crucial period of moral
formation ends. On non-Christian grounds,
the Christian legal tradition remains much
the best.
A certain number of babies are born
blind, and it could well be argued that so
terrible an affliction makes them fit subjects for mercy-killing. In fact, they
are not killed, but surrounded with special
care and grow up with a vivid sense of all
the other possibilities of life that remain
open to them; and it would deeply shock
the moral conscience of the nation if it was
suggested that in view of the great handicap with which they come into the world,
they should be put painlessly out of it. This
general sentiment is particularly strong
among those most concerned, to whom
the idea of destroying their own offspring
is particularly abhorrent.
Neither parents nor doctors are really in
a position to act as judges of life and death.
It is a very serious precedent if a doctor
may prescribe poison at the request of a
third party. It was stated in the Liege trial
that of seven to eight thousand thalidomide
babies, nearly half have already died. Very
often the expectation of life is very small
for the visible defects are matched by internal malformations. But it will never be
known how far another cause has been at
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work, the deliberate termination of life,
even though the doctors have known that
what they were doing could be adjudged
murder by the law, and be condemned by
their colleagues.
So the question prompts itself whether
if the Liege acquittal comes to be taken
as an "all-clear" signal, where the line will
be drawn. Both in antiquity and in Asia
today unwanted children have been and
are exposed. But for the immense strength
of the Christian moral tradition, the lives
of many babies would have been ended in
the last century, on the ground that they
had been brought into the world so near
the starvation line as to have little or no
chance of well-being. Many nineteenthcentury economists took a callous and fatalistic line about the inevitability of starvation for large numbers, but they did not
advocate that the babies so badly placed
at birth should therefore be killed.
The comment concludes with the observation that now that the evils of thalidomide have been discovered, it is hoped that
this particular tragedy will not recur, and
it is very much more with the aged than
with the newly born that the controversy
will be concerned. The decisive argument
against euthanasia being legally approved
is that it would poison the atmosphere in
the closing months or years of life, suggesting the perhaps unspoken thought,
whenever an old and sick person complained that the remedy was in their hands,
and they had only to send for the doctor.
Perhaps there would be in the air the suggestion that they were being selfish in not
doing so, and that their sufferings instead
of being accepted with resignation, or seen
as in the Christian tradition as opportunity,
should be thought to point naturally to the
final solution. Just as there have been
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peoples which have killed their female
children, or of either sex if deformed, so
there have been peoples which have killed
off the old and infirm, as being no good to
themselves or anyone else. People who believe themselves to 'be more humane and
progressive than others in advocating
mercy-killing do not know what they are
doing, or where what they have started can
very well end, and both the law of the land
and the code of the medical profession
must be adamant in maintaining as their
basic principle, the sanctity of human life.
Desegregation
William Kenealy, S.J., has contributed
another significant article on the racial issue in the January 1963 Catholic Mind.
In view of the patent inadequacy of private
effort and persuasion, the author justifies
federal intervention to prohibit segregation.
Father Kenealy proposes that in view of
the persistence of some states in positively
imposing segregation by law, the federal
government should make vigorous use of
its legislative, executive and judicial powers, under the Civil War Amendments, to
combat the gross immorality of racial segregation throughout the United States.
His proposition is not based upon the
naive thesis that government, state or federal, should attempt to enforce all morality. He essays no lyric leap from morality
to legality. Morals and law are related and
interdependent. But they are not identical.
Their respective fields are not coterminous.
The field of law is not private morality but
public morality only: that is, justice and
liberty as they affect the common good and
public welfare of society. But equal liberty
under law, equal protection of law, and
equal voting rights by law, regardless of
race or color, are obviously matters of so-
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cial justice and, therefore, of public morality. Moreover, and of critical importance
to his argument, they are social rights
which have been expressly incorporated
into our federal constitution and thereby
solemnly guaranteed to all Americans as
fundamental federal rights.
The thirteenth amendment abolished
slavery. The fourteenth and the fifteenth
established federal constitutional guarantees against any state law or state action
violating equal liberty under law, equal
protection of law or equal voting rights according to law. These fundamental moral
rights are now fundamental federal rights.
According to Father Kenealy, in our
constitutional system, the States have their
own responsibilities, of course, to obey federal law and to respect federal rights.
Nevertheless, the superior, the paramount
and the ultimate responsibility for the enforcement of federal law and federal rights
has been entrusted by the nation, for the
benefit of every American, to the federal
government. Therefore, when states openly
defy the federal constitution, notoriously
repudiate their responsibilities to federal
law and persistently violate the federal
rights of millions of Americans, it seems
to him that the federal government has a
clear constitutional obligation to respect
its own superior responsibility, to use its
paramount authority and to honor its ultimate national trust. He proposes that it
should do this by alert and vigorous exercise of its legislative, executive and judicial
powers under the Civil War Amendments.
It is a matter of social justice.
The Prayer Case
The latest on the Engel v. Vitale decision comes from the American Bar Association Journal of September 1962 in an

article by Gerald Kirven entitled "Freedom
of Religion or Freedom from Religion?"
The controversial decision of the Supreme Court in banning the New York
"Regents' Prayer" has led Mr. Kirven to
ask whether an overzealous regard for the
rights of a minority may have resulted in
a distortion of the first amendment. He
reasons that the price of nonconformity in
a religious society, if the United States indeed be a religious society, may be to endure in schools and in society at least
identification as nonconformist. The alternative could be minority imposition of
abolition of religious influence in schools
and perhaps ultimately in society at large.
In conclusion, he argues that while our
courts must always intercede to prevent infringements upon freedom of religion, the
courts should guard against decisions which
will identify the power of government with
anti-religion. Freedom of religion does
not compel the entire denial to public
school children of the influence of religion
in their schools. The government is not
neutral in the matter of religion when, at
the instance of one already adequately
protected from compulsion, it lends its
power to the suppression of religion and
thereby champions the cause of freedom
from religion.
Censorship and Prior Restraint
Patrick D. McAnany, S.J., writing in
the current issue of the Kentucky Law
Journal, presents a series of scholarly and
logical arguments for the constitutionality
of prior restraint in the area of movie censorship in an article entitled, "Motion
Picture Censorship and Constitutional
Freedom."
According to Father McAnany, the
states and communities which have adopted
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film licensing techniques have pleaded necessity as a justification for departure from
the traditional use of subsequent punishment as a means of control. The argument
is that films present a unique problem in
matters of obscenity. If they are not reviewed before showing, the remedy of prosecution under criminal statutes comes too
late to avert the evil. With the modern
theatres holding mass audiences and the
program of multiple distribution within the
state, piecemeal prosecution is simply impractical. Furthermore, the punishment
falls upon the wrong person. The exhibitor
is not always able to choose the type of
films he shows. Thus the real culprits, the
producers and distributors, lose only a certain box-office "take" and nothing more.
The solution lies, then, in a system of prior
review and licensing of films which protects the community and exhibitors at the
same time.
Prominent among other reasons for justifying prior control of films ranks the fact
that movies are considered an entertainment medium. Since the theory of constitutional liberty had been traditionally associated with the political process, for a
long time entertainment was regarded as
unprotected. But by 1942 protection began
to be extended. Even here it was not clear
whether the protection was given on the
basis of the Constitution or from an inability to distinguish entertainment from
the expression of ideas. But it was clear
from what happened in the area of motion
pictures that the protection was not of the
same quality as that afforded other media
or the press. Hence the proposition about
freedom of entertainment could be put
thus: entertainment was equally protected
with other speech, but that protection
would be unequally withdrawn since its
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social value was not of the same weight as
that belonging to other areas of expression.
Whatever one may think of a theory of
social utility in the matter of speech, the
facts in the film cases seem to point up
its current adoption by the majority of the
Court.
Other differentiating elements are less
theoretical. The fact that obscenity has become almost the only standard proper for
film censorship indicates the narrow scope
which the licensing power of the censor
now has. This was not always the case.
There was a time when the censor was
given a mandate to rove at large behind
such indefinite standards as "the best interests of the people." Then, too, a distinctive
feature of film control is the fact that the
speech in question is before the licensing
official so that judgment on it is not of a
conjectural nature. Where an official issues
a license to speak based on evidence entirely extrinsic to the speech itself, there
is grave danger that his judgment will prevent a legitimate communication of ideas.
But where, as in film licensing, the speech
itself is before the official as it will be presented to the public, at least the denial of
license can be compared to the speech
questioned. Further, the distinction between restraint falling on communication
before publication and after might be behind the Court's sustaining motion picture
licensing, especially where it is done on a
community, and not a state, basis. The film
is already published and may have been
shown elsewhere in the state before it is
reviewed by the local board of censors. It
would seem captious to demand that each
film should have one free showing and then
allow the state to step in with the censor.
This would hardly be a constitutional distinction on which protection could be
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based.
The author concludes, in part, that the
use of prior licensing of motion pictures
is a unique experiment in peace-time censorship which has against it traditional
distrust and Supreme Court dicta, not to
say a bad personal record. Still the Court
has refused to strike it down as a system
of control. The answer to the conundrum
of why the Court has continued to endorse
the use of prior restraint in an area of free
expression lies in the unique features of
the movies as a medium and the subsidiary
problem of obscenity. Further, the invalidation of a whole system of control
seems to go beyond the purposes of the
Court and encroach upon the policy
choices of the state. Mr. Justice Black has
complained that the Court should not place
itself in the midst of such policy questions
as obscenity and motion pictures, but by
invalidating an entire method of control
in the abstract the Court would have effectively set policy for the state. It is from a
respect for the federal system and the
separation of powers that the Court has
continued to pursue a method of balancing
which answers to the demands of each
case, without at the same time refusing to
give certain general principles as a guide
to the future.
Aid to Education
Patrick D. McAnany, S.J. whose scholarly dissertation in the Kentucky Law
Journal on prior restraint has already been
discussed above, has an equally challenging
paper in the October 1962 issue of the
University of Kansas Law Review. Writing
on the constitutionality of government aid
to church-related schools, Father McAnany
argues that in an orderly society, it is inevitable that a benevolent state and moral-

centered religion will have concurrent interests. Tax exemption of religious institutions is an undeniable recognition of the
fact that these institutions do serve a public
purpose sufficient to warrant assistance. If
tax exemptions were granted to all nonprofit institutions except those of stated
religious preference, the state would without doubt be discriminating against religion. In the Sunday closing law cases, the
Court has effectively resolved concurrent
state-church interests in recognizing that
the Christian church has a special interest
in the observance of Sunday while noting
that the state has a valid interest in having
all citizens observe one day of rest. If justified only by religious considerations, the
Sunday closing laws would automatically
be targets for condemnation; however,
governmental action serving a valid public
purpose escapes the bar of invalidity even
though it operates simultaneously to promote religious interests. Similarly, under
the Federal Hill-Burton Act, government
funds are employed to assist in the construction of new and additional hospital
facilities despite the fact that hospitals
benefiting within the program are owned
and maintained by religious groups or associations.
There are few who would contest the
right of the federal government to finance
the construction and maintenance of
chapels on military reservations, or as a
necessary incidence of this activity, to pay
the salaries of military chaplains who perform a religious ministry to personnel in
the armed forces. Supplying a chaplain's
service is an integral part of the government function of maintaining morale and
preserving a respectable moral order within
the service family. The atheist, the agnostic,
the ethical culturalist may wince at the
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thought of having to contribute to a practice which so openly supports adherence
to a formal creed. Nevertheless, persons of
this genre must realize that their expressed
intentions to be different should not detract
from the right of many others to worship
as they see fit. Far from outlawing the use
of public funds for any religious purpose,
the first amendment in fact dictates that
such funds, in certain defined cases, must
be expended to guarantee the right to practice the religion of one's choice.
In conclusion he submits that parent and
child have a constitutional right to choose
a church-related institution so long as that
institution meets reasonable educational
standards prescribed by the state. To insure enjoyment of this right, the federal

government must never be granted the
power to impose a single educational system upon the people, either directly or
indirectly by exerting formidable economic
pressure. Inasmuch as education in churchrelated schools can and does perform a
public service, some degree of governmental support is recommended. No reasonable constitutional bar exists so long as
government aid to church-related schools
is relegated to the performance of a secular
or public function. In the summing up,
these are inherently practical problems
which are not solved or bettered by monotonous reference to timeworn maxims, shibboleths and slogans. Far from remaining
static, the Constitution must forever be
reinterpreted in light of living events.

SEPARATION

or indirectly, whatever form the assistance
takes, to support any part of an educational program that includes religious instruction, this will spell the answer to the
question of using federal funds to aid parochial schools.
One thing is clear, however, and this is
that on the basis of what has been done
and said in the past, there is no basis for a
categorical opinion that federal assistance
for parochial schools would be unconstitutional. And until the Supreme Court has
an opportunity to pass on the question,
Congress, in dealing with the problem,
will have to be guided by its own intrepretation of what the separation principle, as
it has evolved in our history, tradition and
constitutional interpretation, should mean
in the context of today's problems and
with due regard for all the competing considerations that are at stake.

(continued)
of federal funds to support at least limited
assistance for parochial schools as part of
a larger program in aid of both public and
private schools. Or, if the Court, supported
by some of its past decisions, moves explicitly toward a general principle that the
Constitution prohibits only the giving of
aid to religion and does not require the
exclusion of religious bodies in the nondiscriminatory disbursement of funds for social welfare purposes, there will be no difficulty in sustaining federal grants to parochial schools determined on the same
basis as grants to public and other private
schools. But if the Court in the future repudiates the result in the Everson case
and elevates the "no aid" idea to the point
that no public funds can be used, directly

